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GHSA-hcrc-79hj-m3qh

GitHub Security Advisory

Wazuh server vulnerable to remote code execution

✓ GitHub Reviewed CRITICAL Has CVE

Advisory Details

### Summary
An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows for remote code execution on Wazuh servers.
The vulnerability can be triggered by anybody with API access (compromised dashboard or Wazuh servers in the cluster) or, in certain configurations, even by a compromised agent.

### Details
DistributedAPI parameters are a serialized as JSON and deserialized using `as_wazuh_object` (in `framework/wazuh/core/cluster/common.py`). If an attacker manages to inject an unsanitized dictionary in DAPI request/response, they can forge an unhandled exception (`__unhandled_exc__`) to evaluate arbitrary python code.

Using the server API, it quite easy to trigger. For example, using the `run_as` endpoint (implemented by `run_as_login` in `api/api/controllers/security_controller.py`): the `auth_context` argument is completely controlled by the attacker, and is forwarded to the master server to handle. By sending a malicious `run_as` request to a worker server, it is possible to execute code on the master server.

It is also possible to exploit the bug as a compromised agent, in certain configurations.
A compromised agent can respond to a `getconfig` request with a malicious JSON object (containing a serialized unhandled exception). If the `getconfig` request was caused because of a server API request to `/agents/{agent_id}/config/{component}/{configuration}` (`api.controllers.agent_controller.get_agent_config`), and the agent is managed by a server other than the one that received the server API request, the unsafe deserialization will occur on the server that received the original server API request.

```
user server A server B agent
| | | |
| -get-config-> | | |
| | --get-config-dapi-> | |
| | | --getconf-> |
| | | <-payload-- |
| X <-----payload------ | |
| | | |
```

It is likely that there are more ways to reach the unsafe deserialization function (`as_wazuh_object`), some of them might even be accessible from different contexts (without credentials, or initiated by a compromised agent). I suggest fixing the root cause instead of attempting to sanitize inputs that reach it. Note that there are multiple other ways to execute arbitrary code in `as_wazuh_object`, easier by using a `__callable__`, or potentially abusing callable gadgets in `exception`, `wresults` or `Wazuh`.

### PoC
To trigger using the server API (assuming default credentials):
```bash
curl -X POST -k -u "wazuh-wui:MyS3cr37P450r.*-" -H "Content-Type: application/json" --data '{"__unhandled_exc__":{"__class__": "exit", "__args__": []}}' https://<worker-server>:55000/security/user/authenticate/run_as
```
this will shut down the master server.

### Impact
This is a remote code execution on Wazuh server, affecting the latest version (v4.9.0 at this time)

Affected Packages

Go github.com/wazuh/wazuh
Affected versions: 4.4.0 (fixed in 4.9.1)

Related CVEs

Key Information

GHSA ID
GHSA-hcrc-79hj-m3qh
Published
April 22, 2025 4:53 PM
Last Modified
April 22, 2025 4:53 PM
CVSS Score
9.0 /10
Primary Ecosystem
Go
Primary Package
github.com/wazuh/wazuh
GitHub Reviewed
✓ Yes

Dataset

Last updated: June 14, 2025 6:24 AM

Data from GitHub Advisory Database. This information is provided for research and educational purposes.