[Repository Import] Open Redirect via "continue[to]" parameter
Medium
G
GitLab
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ysx
Vulnerability Details
Technical details and impact analysis
Hi,
While experimenting with Repository Import functionality on a fresh GitLab 9.0 CE install, I noticed that the `continue[to]` parameter can be used to perform an Open Redirect through the inclusion of a double-slash prefix.
## Proof of Concept
The following Proof of Concept URL enables a malicious actor to execute this redirect against any user – as long as they have permissions to view a certain repository.
```
http://<instance>/<user>/<repository>/import?continue[to]=//google.com
```
## Observation
I first noticed the `continue[to]` parameter while receiving the `You're not allowed to make changes to this project directly` message – demonstrating that edit-level access to the repository in question is not required.
Thanks!
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State
Closed
Substate
Resolved
Submitted
Weakness
Open Redirect