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[Repository Import] Open Redirect via "continue[to]" parameter

Medium
G
GitLab
Submitted None
Reported by ysx

Vulnerability Details

Technical details and impact analysis

Open Redirect
Hi, While experimenting with Repository Import functionality on a fresh GitLab 9.0 CE install, I noticed that the `continue[to]` parameter can be used to perform an Open Redirect through the inclusion of a double-slash prefix. ## Proof of Concept The following Proof of Concept URL enables a malicious actor to execute this redirect against any user – as long as they have permissions to view a certain repository. ``` http://<instance>/<user>/<repository>/import?continue[to]=//google.com ``` ## Observation I first noticed the `continue[to]` parameter while receiving the `You're not allowed to make changes to this project directly` message – demonstrating that edit-level access to the repository in question is not required. Thanks!

Report Details

Additional information and metadata

State

Closed

Substate

Resolved

Submitted

Weakness

Open Redirect