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Arbitrary File Download as Shopmanager

High
A
Automattic
Submitted None
Reported by simonscannell

Vulnerability Details

Technical details and impact analysis

Path Traversal
Due to a flaw in the way WooCommerce handles downloadable products, a shop manager can download arbitrary files on the server. The video shows the exploit and how simple it is: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bkrHpqht5SM The function responsible for validating the download file input is the following: (/woocommerce/includes/abstracts/abstract-wc-product.php) ``` public function set_downloads( $downloads_array ) { $downloads = array(); $errors = array(); foreach ( $downloads_array as $download ) { if ( is_a( $download, 'WC_Product_Download' ) ) { $download_object = $download; } else { $download_object = new WC_Product_Download(); // If we don't have a previous hash, generate UUID for download. if ( empty( $download['download_id'] ) ) { $download['download_id'] = wp_generate_uuid4(); } $download_object->set_id( $download['download_id'] ); $download_object->set_name( $download['name'] ); $download_object->set_file( $download['file'] ); } // Validate the file extension. if ( ! $download_object->is_allowed_filetype() ) { if ( $this->get_object_read() ) { /* translators: %1$s: Downloadable file */ $errors[] = sprintf( __( 'The downloadable file %1$s cannot be used as it does not have an allowed file type. Allowed types include: %2$s', 'woocommerce' ), '<code>' . basename( $download_object->get_file() ) . '</code>', '<code>' . implode( ', ', array_keys( $download_object->get_allowed_mime_types() ) ) . '</code>' ); } continue; } // Validate the file exists. if ( ! $download_object->file_exists() ) { if ( $this->get_object_read() ) { /* translators: %s: Downloadable file */ $errors[] = sprintf( __( 'The downloadable file %s cannot be used as it does not exist on the server.', 'woocommerce' ), '<code>' . $download_object->get_file() . '</code>' ); } continue; } $downloads[ $download_object->get_id() ] = $download_object; } if ( $errors ) { $this->error( 'product_invalid_download', $errors[0] ); } $this->set_prop( 'downloads', $downloads ); } ``` When I took a look at the function I naturally wanted to see if there was a way to bypass is_allowed_filetype(). The function does the following: ``` public function is_allowed_filetype() { if ( 'relative' !== $this->get_type_of_file_path() ) { return true; } return ! $this->get_file_extension() || in_array( $this->get_file_type(), $this->get_allowed_mime_types(), true ); } ``` It will see what type of file path it is (it could be a URL, it could be an absolute path etc.) and interestingly enough it will only validate the file extension if it is a relative path. So of course I wanted to see what would happen if we would enter an absolute path, since then I could bypass the extension check entirely. ``` public function get_type_of_file_path( $file_path = '' ) { $file_path = $file_path ? $file_path : $this->get_file(); if ( 0 === strpos( $file_path, 'http' ) || 0 === strpos( $file_path, '//' ) ) { return 'absolute'; } elseif ( '[' === substr( $file_path, 0, 1 ) && ']' === substr( $file_path, -1 ) ) { return 'shortcode'; } else { return 'relative'; } } ``` And I was right. Funny enough, input is only an absolute path if it starts with two slashes. So all I did was to set the download file to //home/simon/html/wordpress/wp-config.php and then just downloaded it. As a patch recommendation: Also check the file types if it is an absolute path. Best regards, Simon ## Impact When an attacker can download the wp-config.php file, a privilege escalation is easily possible. He could either log into the database if the DB host is not localhost or if the WordPress installation is used with a shared hosting provider, he can simply get some hosting space on the same server and then access the database, which leads to a complete compromise of the installation.

Report Details

Additional information and metadata

State

Closed

Substate

Resolved

Submitted

Weakness

Path Traversal