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SSO through odnoklassniki uses http rather than https

Low
B
Bumble
Submitted None
Reported by matthijsmelissen

Vulnerability Details

Technical details and impact analysis

Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
SUMMARY When using single-sign on through odnoklassniki, the user is sent to an http (non-https) URL, allowing an attacker (under some conditions) to log in to the victim's Badoo account by stealing odnoklassniki credentials, as well as to execute a CSRF-attack on the log-in form. RECOMMENDATION Let https://badoo.com/ok/authorize.phtml?rt=060285&js_use_scheme=https redirect to https://www.odnoklassniki.ru rather than the http version. STEPS TO REPRODUCE 1) The victim navigates to https://badoo.com/nl/signin/ and selects 'odnoklassniki' 2) The victim is forwarded to http://www.odnoklassniki.ru/oauth/authorize?response_type=code&display=popup&client_id=126351872&scope=VALUABLE_ACCESS%3BGET_EMAIL&state=<state>&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fbadoo.com%2Fexternal%2Fredirector.phtml Impact 1: 3) The attacker intercepts the http traffic and presents the victim a fake odnoklassniki log-in page 4) The attacker intercepts the odnoklassniki credentials entered by the victim 5) The attacker uses the intercepted odnoklassniki credentials to log in to the victim's Badoo account Impact 2: 3) The attacker intercepts the URL at http://www.odnoklassniki.ru/ to which the victim is forwarded (which notably includes the state variable, which is connected to the victim's session) 4) The attacker browses to this URL and enters its own odnoklassniki credentials 5) The attacker intercepts the URL returning to https://badoo.com/external/redirector.phtml (including its parameters) and invites the victim to visit this URL 6) The attacker is now logged in to Badoo on the victim's device ## Impact Impact 1: The attacker can log in to the victim's Badoo account by stealing odnoklassniki credentials, under the following conditions: * The attacker can modify traffic between the user and badoo.com (e.g. the user is connected to a rogue access point) * The victim is willing to enter his odnoklassniki credentials on a http version of the site Impact 2: The attacker can execute a CSRF attack on the log-in form (i.e. the attacker log himself in to badoo.com on the victim's browser), under the following conditions: * The attacker can intercept traffic between the user and badoo.com (e.g. the attacker is connected to the same unprotected wifi network) * The attacker succeeds in causing the victim to browse to a URL provided by the attacker.

Report Details

Additional information and metadata

State

Closed

Substate

Resolved

Submitted

Weakness

Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information