Vulnerabilities

IPv6-in-IPv4 tunneling (RFC 4213) allows an attacker to spoof and route traffic via an exposed network interface.

IPv4-in-IPv6 and IPv6-in-IPv6 tunneling (RFC 2473) do not require the validation or verification of the source of a network packet, allowing an attacker to spoof and route arbitrary traffic via an exposed network interface. This is a similar issue to CVE-2020-10136.

RADIUS Protocol under RFC 2865 is susceptible to forgery attacks by a local attacker who can modify any valid Response (Access-Accept, Access-Reject, or Access-Challenge) to any other response using a chosen-prefix collision attack against MD5 Response Authenticator signature.

The TCP protocol in RFC 9293 has a timing side channel that makes it easier for remote attackers to infer the content of one TCP connection from a client system (to any server), when that client system is concurrently obtaining TCP data at a slow rate from an attacker-controlled server, aka the "SnailLoad" issue. For example, the attack can begin by measuring RTTs via the TCP segments whose role is to provide an ACK control bit and an Acknowledgment Number.

DHCP can add routes to a client’s routing table via the classless static route option (121). VPN-based security solutions that rely on routes to redirect traffic can be forced to leak traffic over the physical interface. An attacker on the same local network can read, disrupt, or possibly modify network traffic that was expected to be protected by the VPN.

The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023.

Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using LLC/SNAP headers with invalid length and Ethernet to Wifi frame conversion (and optionally VLAN0 headers).

Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using LLC/SNAP headers with invalid length (and optionally VLAN0 headers)

Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using combinations of VLAN 0 headers, LLC/SNAP headers, and converting frames from Ethernet to Wifi and its reverse.

Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard or ARP inspection can be bypassed using combinations of VLAN 0 headers and LLC/SNAP headers.

IP-in-IP protocol specifies IP Encapsulation within IP standard (RFC 2003, STD 1) that decapsulate and route IP-in-IP traffic is vulnerable to spoofing, access-control bypass and other unexpected behavior due to the lack of validation to verify network packets before decapsulation and routing.